Constructing an Ideal of Public Reason*

LAWRENCE B. SOLUM**

How should citizens in a modern pluralist democracy debate and
discuss public affairs? There is wide agreement that the government
should not censor public debate about politics, at least not without
very good reason. But when it comes to a related question of political
morality - "To what ideal should citizens aspire in political debate?" - the issue is cloudy. For example, some have argued that
religious reason should be excluded from public debate; others argue
for the exclusion of statements which degrade people on the basis of
their religion, race or ethnicity. Still others contend that in public
debate, an ideal of political morality should mirror the freedom of
expression: all viewpoints should contend in a marketplace of ideas.
An ideal of public reason can provide guidance on these issues. Thus,
an investigation of the idea of public reason may illuminate the relationship between religion and politics.
This Article undertakes the construction of an ideal of public reason.' It begins with an investigation of the idea behind the phrase
"public reason"- focusing on the work of John Rawls. The idea is
further developed by considering the various possibilities for an ideal
or normative standard of public reason. As each option is considered,
some possible formulations are discarded and additional specifications are added. The penultimate section of the Article restates the
ideal that is constructed through this process of elaboration, evaluation, and elimination. Finally, a brief survey of historical uses of the
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idea of public reason is contained in the Appendix to this Article.
I.

THE IDEA OF PUBLIC REASON

The phrase "public reason" is ambiguous and might be used to
express any number of distinct ideas. As used in this Article, "public
reason" refers to the common reason of the public in its capacity as
citizens constituting a polity. An ideal of public reason is a normative standard for the use of public reason. The phrase, "public reason," has a number of uses - some distantly and others closely
related to the use in this Article. This section 'explores the use of
public reason in contemporary political philosophy. I will focus on
Rawls' idea of public reason, along with related uses by others.2
Rawls' notion of public reason has already received considerable attention from legal scholars3 and philosophers 4 and will serve as a
focus for discussion. The idea of public reason was introduced in several of his essays in the 1980s,' was extensively developed in his
Melden Lectures entitled "The Idea of Free Public Reason" delivered in 1990,1 and published in revised form in Political Liberalism
in 1993. 7
2.

See, e.g.,

KENT

GREENAWALT,

RELIGIOUS

CONVICTIONS

AND

POLITICAL

CHOICE 56-76 (1988); Paul Weithman, The Separation of Church and State: Some
Questionsfor ProfessorAudi, 20 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 52 (1991); Robert Audi, The Sepa-

ration of Church and State and the Obligations of Citizenship, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF,
259, 277-86 (1989). The works of Michael Perry, discussed infra in text accompanying
notes 16 - 28, have been particularly influential in the formation of my own views.
3. See, e.g., Yvette M. Barksdale, The Presidency and Administrative Value Selection, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 273, 312 n. 224 (1993); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Speakable
Ethics and ConstitutionalLaw: A Review Essay, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1523 (1989); Edward B. Foley, Political Liberalism and Establishment Clause Jurisprudence,43 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 963, 969 n.14 (1993); Eric Rakowski, Taking and Saving Lives, 93
COLUM. L. REV. 1063, 1135 n. 168 (1993); David A.J. Richards, Book Review, 23 GA. L.
REV. 1189 (1989) (reviewing KENT GREENAWALT, CONFLICTS OF LAW AND MORALITY
(1987) and KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE
(1988)).
4. See, e.g., Jean Hampton, Should PoliticalPhilosophy Be Done without Metaphysics, 99 ETHICS 791 (1989); Jeremy Waldron, Theoretical Foundations 6f Liberalism, 37 PHIL. Q. 127 (1987).
5. I have been unable to locate the phrase "public reason" in A Theory of Justice;
it does not appear in the index. See JOHN RAWLS. A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) [hereinafter TJ]. A very similar idea does appear, however, in his discussions of "publicity." See
John Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory: The Dewey Lectures, 77 J. PHIL,
515, 537 (1980) [hereinafter Dewey Lectures] ("Citizens in a well-ordered society agree
on these beliefs because they can be supported ... by publicly shared methods of inquiry
.* familiar from common sense and [including] . . . the methods and conclusions of
science, when they are well established and not controversial."); see also TJ § 69, at
454. The idea does appear in John Rawls, Justice as Fairness:Politicalnot Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 223 (1985), and in the essays cited below.
6. John Rawls, The Idea of Free Public Reason, Inaugural Abraham Melden Lectures, Department of Philosophy, University of California at Irvine (Feb. 27 and Mar. 1,
1990).
7. JOHN RAWLS. POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993).
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In an early formulation, Rawls explained what he has called the
"idea of free public reason":
[G]reat values fall under the idea of free public reason, and are expressed
in the guidelines for public inquiry and in the steps taken to secure that
such inquiry is free and public, as well as informed and reasonable. These
values include not only the appropriate use of the fundamental concepts of
judgment, inference, and evidence, but also the virtues of reasonableness
and fair-mindedness as shown in the adherence to the criteria and procedures of common sense knowledge, and to the methods and conclusion of
science when not controversial, as well as respect for the precepts governing
reasonable political discussion.8

Although this discussion contains the core of the Rawls' position, a
few additional points deserve separate discussion.
First, Rawls understands public reason as the reason of a political
society. A society's reason is its "way of formulating its plans, of
putting its ends in an order of priority and of making its decisions
accordingly." 9 Public reason contrasts with the "nonpublic reasons of
churches and of many other associations in civil society."' 10 Both
public and nonpublic reason share features that are essential to reason itself, such as simple rules of inference and evidence,"' Public
reasons, however, are limited to premises and modes of reasoning
that can appeal to the public at large. Rawls argues that these include "presently accepted general beliefs and forms of reasoning
found in common sense, and the methods of science when these are
not controversial."' 2 By contrast, the nonpublic reason of a church
might include premises about the authority of sacred texts and
modes of reasoning that appeal to the interpretive authority of particular persons.
Second, the limits imposed by Rawls' ideal of public reason do not
apply to all actions by the state or even to all coercive uses of state
power. Rather, his ideal is limited to what he calls "the constitutional essentials" and "questions of basic justice."' 3 Thus, the scope
of the freedom of speech and qualifications for the franchise would
be subject to the Rawlsian ideal, but the details of tax legislation
and the regulation of pollution control would not.' 4
8. John Rawls, The Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus, 64

N.Y.U. L. REV. 233, 244 (1989).
9. RAWLS, supra note 7, at 212.

10. Id. at 213.
11. Id. at 220.
12. Id. at 224.
13. Id. at 214; see also id. § 5, at 227-30.
14. Rawls notes that a full account of public reason would need to offer an account
of these subjects and how they differ from the constitutional essentials and questions of

Third, Rawls' ideal of public reason applies to citizens and public
officials when they engage in political advocacy in a public forum; it
also governs the decisions that officials make and the votes that citizens cast in elections. The ideal does not apply to personal reflection
and deliberation about political questions; by implication it could not
apply to such reflection or deliberation about questions that are not
political in nature. 15
With these features in mind, we can offer a summary of the Rawlsian ideal of public reason; this ideal has three main features: (1)
The ideal of public reason limits the use of reason to (a) the general
features of all reason, such as rules of inference and evidence, and
(b) generally shared beliefs, common-sense reasoning, and the noncontroversial methods of science. (2) The ideal applies to deliberation and discussion concerning the basic structure and the
constitutional essentials. (3) The ideal applies (a) to both citizens
and public officials when they engage in public political debate, (b)
to citizens when they vote, and (c) to public officials when they engage in official action - so long as the debate, vote or action concerns the subjects specified in (2). With Rawls' view in mind, we
proceed to two preliminary subjects: first, the role of the idea of public reason in the regulation of public discourse and, second, the ways
in which a particular ideal of public reason might be justified.
II. THE ROLE AND JUSTIFICATION OF PUBLIC REASON
In this part of the Article, I will examine two issues that set the
foundation for specifying and justifying a liberal ideal of public reason. The first issue concerns the role of an ideal of public reason; the
second issue concerns the standards by which the case for such an
ideal should be measured.
A.

The Role of an Ideal of Public Reason

Public reason is the common reason of the public at large - in
our. case, the citizenry of a democratic society. Of course, an understanding of the role of an ideal of public reason requires a prior
understanding of the role of public reason itself. Thus, the discussion
that follows assumes a notion of that purpose similar to that advanced by Rawls: Public reason is the reason of the public as the
citizens of a democratic polity. Public reason is used in political debate in the public sphere and is used by public officials to justify the
Constitution, laws, executive actions, and judicial decisions.
An ideal of public reason, or standard of civility, is intended to
basic justice. Id. at 215.
15. Id.
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serve a regulative role. More particularly, an ideal of public reason
regulates public reason-giving practices in two ways: (1) as a standard for self-evaluation and, (2) as a standard for political criticism.
Each of these aspects of the role deserves comment.
An ideal of public reason serves as a standard for self-evaluation
in the sense that it can be used by citizens to guide their own use of
reason in the public sphere. One can ask, "What kinds of arguments
should I give or refrain from giving in public political debate?" An
ideal of public reason answers this question by articulating a set of
reasonable standards of civility to one's fellow citizens. The first role
for an ideal of public reason assumes voluntary compliance. In this
role, the ideal is affirmed voluntarily because it is seen as reasonable
by members of a political community.
An ideal of public reason can serve another role - as a standard
for the political criticism of argument in the public sphere. One can
ask, "When is it proper for me to criticize the argumentation of a
fellow citizen on the ground that the reasons offered transgress the
limits of civility?" An ideal of public reason answers this question by
defining standards for political criticism of reasons given in public.
The second role of public reason does not assume coercive enforcement by the state, as such enforcement would violate the political
right of freedom of expression. But the second role of public reason
does not rule out the use of social pressure to encourage compliance
with the ideal. Political criticism can change behavior in two ways:
(1) by offering reasons that are accepted and, (2) by communicating
disapproval that motivates because of citizens' desires for the approval of their fellows.
B. Justifying an Ideal of Public Reason
In the case of a noncompulsory ideal of public reason, we must
formulate the ideal and provide justifications for it that are addressed to those for whom the ideal is intended to have normative
force. The ideal must be one which they could reasonably accept,
and the justifications must be reasonably persuasive. Why should
these limits be observed? Consider two answers.
One answer is instrumental: a noncompulsory ideal of public reason must generate its own support. If the ideal and its justifications
cannot reasonably be accepted by significant groups in our polity,
then the ideal will not serve the purpose of facilitating and regulating deliberation in the public sphere.
The second answer is based on the idea of respect for one's fellow

citizens as free and equal. The force of this reason can be illustrated
by examining David Smolin's review 6 of Michael Perry's recent
book, Love and Power.17 In that book (his position has since
changed),' 8 Perry argued for an ideal of "ecumenical political dialogue"' that includes basic standards of civility and commitment to
two attitudes called "fallibilism and pluralism.1 20 Fallibilism requires a commitment to the idea of self-critical rationality, and pluralism involves the affirmation that moral pluralism can result in
richer moral insight than moral monism.2 ' Smolin's review objects to
these requirements from the perspective of an evangelical 22 Christian
perspective.
In particular, Smolin argues, "Perry's theory excludes from dialogue those groups unwilling to accept the dialogic virtues of fallibilism and pluralism and the consequent distinction between religious
faith and religious belief."'23 Smolin argues that Perry's ideal would
exclude members of various evangelical, fundamentalist, and pentecostal Protestants and traditional Catholics, Anglicans and Lutherans. 24 He then argues, "[T]hose excluded by Perry's criteria, such as
myself, are going to protest that their exclusion is unfair. 25 Smolin
does not offer a reason for his charge of unfairness at this point, but
moves to another line of critique. "More importantly, those excluded, who comprise a culturally significant and politically active
portion of the population, are less and less willing to accept the kind
of exclusion Perry perpetuates."2 6 Why unwilling?
Perry

. .

. makes no serious attempt to persuade those he excludes of the

propriety of their exclusion. Why should those who view pluralism and fallibilism as vices accept them as norms of civic virtue? Why should those
who consider Perry's distinction between religious faith and religious belief
to be heretical be persuaded by a vision of dialogue premised
on acceptance
27'
of this distinction as the mark of "authentic religion?

Smolin's point is that Perry has not offered reasons for his ideal of
16. David M. Smolin, Regulating Religious and Cultural Conflict in a
Postmodern America: A Response to Professor Perry, 76 IOWA L. REV. 1067 (1991).
17. MICHAEL J. PERRY, LOVE AND POWER: THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND MORALITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1991).

18. See Michael J. Perry, Religious Morality and Political Choice: Further
Thoughts-And Second Thoughts-On Love and Power, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 703,
713 (1993); Michael J. Perry, Toward an Ecumenical Politics, 60 GEO. WASH. L, REV.
599 (1992) [hereinafter Perry, Toward an Ecumenical Politics].
19. Perry does not call his ideal an "ideal of public reason," but the functions of
the two ideals are similar.
20. PERRY, supra note 17, at 100.
21. I will not investigate the precise meaning of Perry's "attitude of pluralism."
22. Smolin is a Reformed Christian. See Smolin, supra note 16, at 1079 & n.54.
23. Id. at 1077.
24. See id. at 1077-78.
25. Id. at 1079.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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ecumenical discourse that could be taken as reasonable by someone
who shares Smolin's convictions. Perry offered reasons from within
his comprehensive religious view. But from within Smolin's own and
quite different religious conception, Perry's starting points are not
axiomatic. Indeed, some of Perry's premises are heretical from Smolin's evangelical perspective. In an Article written after Smolin's review, Perry expresses concern about Smolin's objection and retreats
somewhat, stating that "the essential criterion [for28 ecumenical dialogue] is less fallibilism than public accessibility.
The exchange between Perry and Smolin has an important lesson
for the question at hand: What sort of justification should be given
for an ideal of public reason? An ideal of public reason must be
justified by arguments that can be accepted as reasonable by members of the public to which the ideal is addressed. By formulating
and arguing for his ideal of ecumenical discourse from a liberal
Catholic perspective, Perry advanced reasons that could not be accepted as reasonable by Smolin, who rejected many of Perry's religious premises. Smolin asks for arguments that he can view as fair
and reasonable from his evangelical perspective.
The point of the exchange between Smolin and Perry can be expressed in the following more abstract (yet illuminating) formulation: An ideal of public reason is reflexive in the sense that it applies
to its own public justification. An ideal of public reason must be justified by public reason. Moreover, this requirement of justificatory
reflexivity has implications for the content of the ideal. An ideal
should include the idea that public reason gives citizens reasons that
are public, in the sense that they could reasonably be considered as
motivating by those to whom they'are addressed. This point is reinforced by the role of public reason. For example, one role of public
reason is to give citizens reasons to obey the law of their own free
will on the basis that the law is reasonably justified. If the sole justification for a law is a nonpublic reason (such as a deep premise of a
comprehensive moral theory or a sectarian religious view), then there
will be many citizens who cannot obey the law because on the
ground that they see the law as reasonably justified - although they
still may obey because of fear of punishment.
The reflexivity of public reason has a practical corollary: An ideal
of public reason will emerge in a public political culture as a result
of public debate and discussion. As a practical matter, the ideal will
28.

Perry, Toward an Ecumenical Politics, supra note 18, at 617.

change over time and debate over the contours of the ideal will itself
be shaped by the prevailing ideal at any given point in time.
The exchange between Perry and Smolin has a second implication
for the content of a liberal ideal of public reason. Such an ideal
should include the idea that public reason gives citizens reasons that
are reasonable in the sense that they are limited by the principle of
fairness. Smolin's objection that Perry's ideal of ecumenical dialogue
is unfair can be reconstructed as an argument based on the notion of
respect for other citizens as free and equal. Such respect does not
mean only giving other citizens reasons which they already accept as
true. Treating others as free and equal does not mean catering to
existing beliefs and desires; indeed, one could argue that catering to
existing beliefs and desires is disrespectful because it treats others as
unreasonable. The principle of respect for citizens as free and equal
does mean that we should give our fellow citizens the sort of reasons
that they could reasonably accept.
The modal operator "could" is crucial here. The requirement is
not to give reasons that all or most of one's fellow citizens will accept; rather the requirement is to give reasons they reasonably could
accept. For example, an ideal of public reason that excluded Smolin
from public discourse is not one that he reasonably could accept as Smolin himself argued. A more inclusive ideal may not be one
that he does accept - he might think that atheist or blasphemous
discourse ought to be excluded from public discourse, but the inclusive ideal is one that he reasonably could accept. This ideal does not
treat him as a second-class citizen.
With a core notion of the role and justification of an ideal of public reason in place, I now turn to the content of the ideal. The following section outlines basic distinctions about the possible structures of
an ideal of public reason.

III.

THE STRUCTURE OF IDEALS OF PUBLIC REASON

This section explores the possible structures of an ideal of public
reason by discussing distinctions about the content of such an ideal.
Each distinction marks a dimension in conceptual space: Any ideal
of public reason will occupy a particular position with respect to
each of the dimensions that is identified. If this point seems too abstract, consider a less formal version. We can imagine many different ideals of public reason. Can we organize and categorize their
features to systematize the ways in which they differ?
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A. Distinction One: Four Contexts to Which an Ideal of Public
Reason Might Apply
The first distinction relates to the domain of deliberation and discussion to which an ideal of public reason might be applied. At one
extreme, an ideal might apply to all reasoning, whether deliberation
or discussion, whether public or private, about any topic whatsoever. 29 At the opposite extreme, we might imagine an ideal that was
limited to the most formal and public uses of reason. For example,
only the written opinions of the courts of law and the texts of statutes and executive orders might be subject to the requirement. For
practical purposes, we can distinguish four contexts in which an
ideal of public reason might be applied.
Call the first context "private deliberation and discussion." The
first context is important because it marks the domain to which an
ideal of public reason does not apply. Thus, private deliberation
about private life is not regulated by the ideal. By private deliberation, I mean the use of reason by an individual without discussion
with others. By deliberation about private life, I mean deliberation
about one's life plan, one's intimate associations, one's family and so
forth. In addition, private discussion about private life is not the subject of an ideal of public reason.
In a sense, all discussion could be said to be public (or exterior) in
that discussion involves more than one participant. This is not the
sense in which "public" is used in the phrase "public reason." Discussions that are not addressed to the public at large include those
between family members or within voluntary associations. These discussions are private for the purposes of an ideal of public reason.
Call the second context "public discussion about ethics and culture." One can imagine the formulation of an ideal of public reason
that did apply to this context. It could be argued that any use of
reason that is addressed to the public at large should be subject to
the ideal of public reason. Moreover, for some groups and individuals there will be instrumental reasons for adhering to the ideal of
public reason in public debate about ethics and culture. Persuading
as many of one's fellow citizens as possible may require adhering to
an ideal of public reason. But this instrumental reason is not one of
political morality. It does not violate the requirement of civility to
29. Of course, an ideal applied this broadly might not properly be called an ideal
of "public reason," since it would not in any way be limited to reasoning that was public.

offer one's deepest convictions about ethics or culture in public debate, even though reasons expressing such convictions may not be
viewed as reasonable by many groups or individuals.
Call the third context "public discussion about the coercive use of
state power." The case for formulating an ideal of public reason to
cover this context is stronger still. Reason used in the third context is
public in two senses. First, reason-giving in public discussion about
the coercive use of state power is public in the sense that reasons are
given to the public at large. Of course, in any given public discussion, the whole public is not literally addressed in the sense that it
will read or hear the communication., Newspaper editorials, speeches
to which the public is invited, and so forth are addressed to the public in the sense that they are intended for any member of the public
who chooses to read or listen. Second, reason-giving in public discussion about the coercive use of state power is public in the sense that
the subject is public. State power is the power of the public; in a
democratic society, the state acts on behalf of the body of public
citizens. Coercive state power also is directed at the public; when the
requirements of the rule of law are observed, laws and regulations
are addressed to thp public at large.
As I have defined it, the third context is public discussion about
all coercive uses of state power, but reasonable arguments can be
made for a narrower formulation. For example, Rawls limits his case
for an ideal of public reason to public debate about the constitutional
essentials and basic liberties. 30 Of course, there is a sense in which
the constitutional essentials and basic liberties lie at the core of pub-,
lic reason; the constitutional order is the foundation upon which the
public political order is built.
But there are good reasons to extend the ideal of public reason to
all coercive uses of state power. First, most citizens encounter the
state most directly and concretely through the coercive exercise of
power. In a sense, the basic structure and constitutional liberties lie
behind the scene. If public reason is to reconcile citizens with the
political order, it should do so in those instances in which citizens are
likely to ask for justification. For many and perhaps most citizens,
those instances are likely to be ordinary applications of coercive
power and not the extraordinary cases in which the basic structure
or constitutional liberties are called into question.
Second, citizens who ask for justification when they encounter the
coercive power of the state are making a reasonable demand. We
may reply that we can justify the basic structure and constitutional
liberties to them. Suppose they counter that they believe that their
dignity as free and equal citizens is offended if they are coerced
30. See RAWLS, supra note 7, at 227-30.
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without a justification that they see as reasonable. How are we, their
fellow citizens, to argue that their request is unreasonable? Would
we not ask for reasons that we could accept as reasonable, if we were
in their place? In sum, the third context is public discussion about
the coercive use of state power. Although a narrower formulation is
reasonable, the better view is the broader one.
Call the fourth context "deliberation and discussion by officials
acting in their official capacity." It would seem that an ideal of public reason must apply to this context if it is to count as an ideal of
public reason at all. The use of reason by public officials in their
official capacity is public in both senses in which public discussion
about the coercive use of state power is public: Public officials address the public at large, and their actions in their official capacities
are on behalf of and directed at the public. In addition, when citizens use reason to discuss public matters, they may do so in their
capacity as private citizens. However, when officials use reason in
their official capacity, they are public persons (they personify the
public) in the sense that they occupy the role of public official. Because this context is public in all three senses, we might say that an
ideal of public reason is essentially concerned with deliberation and
discussion by officials in their official capacity.
B. Distinction Two: Causal Influence Distinguishedfrom Use in
Reasoning
The second distinction is between causal influence and use in reasoning. This distinction goes to the kind of constraint that an ideal of
public reason places on individual action. It might be argued that
citizens and officials should not allow nonpublic reasons, such as
their comprehensive moral or religious views, to have any causal influence on their public actions. For example, a legislator may not
cast a vote for or against a bill if she suspects that her vote would be
caused by her religious views. This way of formulating an ideal of
public reason seems implausible. Of course, one might ask citizens to
engage in a thought experiment, asking "Would I take this action
even if I did not hold my comprehensive view?" But if one believes
that one's nonpublic beliefs have a pervasive influence on one's action, compliance with a causal formulation of the ideal may simply
be impossible. One can imagine a Catholic saying, "Any action I
take is influenced by my religion, because my identity is constituted
in part by my Catholicism. I have no idea how I would act if this
were not so."

A more plausible formulation of the ideal would focus on the use
of nonpublic reasons in deliberation and discussion. A requirement of
public reason can readily be applied to one's giving of reasons in
debate and discussion. Application to deliberation may be more difficult, but seems possible. One's conscious deliberations are open to
introspection, and one can attempt to deliberate in ways that limit
the role of nonpublic reasons.
C. Distinction Three: Direct versus Foundational Use of Reason
The third distinction is between direct and foundational use of
reason. This distinction addresses the following difficulty. If an ideal
of public reason were to require that reasons be public all the way
down, then the ideal would be far too stringent. Take the following
example of a seemingly public reason: Every citizen deserves respect
as a human being. This reason is public in the sense that it can be
derived from our public political culture, and it does not rely on any
particular moral or religious view. On the other hand, it might turn
out that many citizens believe this public reason holds for nonpublic
reasons. For example, some citizens may believe that every citizen
deserves respect as a human being because Scripture reveals that all
humans were created by God in God's image. In this case, the public
reason has a nonpublic foundation.
Why would an ideal of public reason that excluded beliefs held on
the basis of nonpublic reasons be too stringent? One answer to this
question is that such exclusion might be viewed as unprincipled and
unfair. Ruling out the foundational use of nonpublic reasons would
be inconsistent with the Kantian idea that the only limits of reason
should be those imposed by reason itself.31 For example, some citizens may believe that they have a moral obligation to bring their
deep moral beliefs to bear in their private deliberations on questions
of political morality. Although these citizens might be willing to accept an ideal of public reason that excluded the foundational use of
nonpublic reasons as a modus vivendi, as an unprincipled compromise necessary to avoid the greater evil of public disorder, they could
not affirm the exclusion of public reasons with private foundations on
principled grounds. This objection - that public reason as mere modus vivendi is unprincipled - is important, because the justification
for an ideal of public reason should be one that the public at large
can affirm as reasonable.
31. This idea is discussed below in an Appendix. See infra text accompanying
notes 52-55.
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D. Distinction Four: Secular Reasons Distinguishedfrom Public
Reasons
The fourth distinction is between two pairs of reason categories.
The first pair of categories, frequently discussed in connection with
the role of religion in politics, includes religious reasons and secular
reasons. The second pair of categories includes public reasons and
nonpublic reasons. The point of the fourth distinction is that these
pairs do not map the same difference between kinds of reasons. Reasons that are religious may be public, and reasons that are secular
may be nonpublic.
For example, the injunction "Thou shalt not kill" is a public reason, even though it is a quotation from a religious text. This injunction expresses a belief that the killing of humans is a wrong that can
be derived from our public political culture, of which the text itself is
likely a part. Consider by contrast a secular proposition of the hedonistic variant of utilitarian moral theory - that the moral evaluation of an action is determined solely by the pain or pleasure that
will result. This proposition is not derived from our public political
culture, but is instead a controversial part of a comprehensive moral
doctrine. For this reason, this utilitarian proposition is nonpublic,
even though it is formulated in secular terms.
If reasons that are in some sense religious can be public, and reasons that are secular can be nonpublic, then it follows that the religious/secular reason distinction does not map directly onto the
public/nonpublic reason distinction. This is not to deny that many
religious reasons are nonpublic or that many public reasons are also
secular. In some contexts, subsets of the two reason categories will
map onto each other (roughly, at least); in contemporary American
society, for example, if one focuses on sectarian religious reasons on
the one hand, while focusing on secular public policy debate, on the
other hand, then the religious reasons will almost all be nonpublic
and the secular reasons will almost all be public. The point of this
section is to warn against overgeneralizing from such special
contexts.
E.

Three Kinds of Principles: Laissez Faire, Inclusionary, and
Exclusionary

The fifth and final distinction is between three different principles
by which an ideal of public reason can express the requirement that
reason be public. Call the first expression of the requirement "the

principle of laissez faire." This principle interprets the idea of public
reason as reason which is free of constraint. Call the second expression of the requirement "the principle of exclusion." An exclusionary
requirement of public reason is a requirement that the reasons given
or relied upon exclude nonpublic ones. Call the third formulation of
the requirement of public reason "the principle of inclusion." An inclusionary requirement of public reason is a requirement that the
reasons given or relied upon include public ones. This section begins
with the principle of laissez faire, then explores a variety of inclusionary and exclusionary principles.
1. The Principle of Laissez Faire
One might argue that the best ideal of public reason would draw
upon Kant's notion that public reason ought to be free, limited only
by standards internal to reason itself.32 This might be read as implying that all reasons should be allowed so that the truth can be revealed in public debate. If the principle of laissez faire were accepted
as the ideal of public reason, then any reason that was sincerely believed to have argumentative force could be advanced in public argument. For example, public officials might advance religious reasons
for the coercive use of state power if they believed that these arguments were valid. No reason would be excluded from public discussion or deliberation on the ground that it was not public - in Rawl's
sense that public reasons are those based on common sense, science,
or the public political culture.
Although the principle of laissez faire is a conceptual possibility, it
is not a live option for our political culture. Given the fact of pluralism, we do not expect the rough and tumble of political argument to
reveal the truth about such deep matters as our duties to God, the
nature of good, or the meaning of life. Even if offered sincerely and
with a willingness to engage in wide-ranging discourse until the dispute over their truth is resolved, reasons that directly rely on premises concerning these deep matters will be rejected by many as
unreasonable justifications for political action. One can imagine that
if the world were arranged differently, this would not be so. If
humans were immortal and their reason as perfect as that of angels,
then even the deepest questions might be seen as resolvable by conscientious public debate. But our lives must come to an end, and our
reason is not perfect. For us, the principle of laissez faire cannot
serve to express the ideal of public reason.
32. See infra text accompanying notes 52-55.
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2. Some Exclusionary Principles
An ideal of public reason could be formulated in terms of a variety of exclusionary principles. Examination of such principles begins
with the most stringent requirement - that only reasons accepted
by the whole public be allowed as public reasons.
a. Exclusion of Contested Beliefs
The most stringent formulation of an exclusionary principle would
be the exclusion of all beliefs and modes of reasoning that are not
accepted by the whole public. This principle could be interpreted as
literally requiring universal agreement on all premises and inferences. In this form, the principle would constrict public reason to the
vanishing point, because there is at least one citizen who will deny
the truth of almost every conceivable premise of political argument.
Perhaps there is also a philosopher who will contest the validity of
every mode of reasoning.
Consider then a first step in relaxing the exclusion-of-contestedbeliefs principle: The principle could be relaxed so a belief is counted
as contested only if it is not contested by any adult citizens in full
possession of their faculties, acting on the basis of a sincere desire to
reach the truth. Even this relaxed version of the exclusion-of-all-contested-belief principle would leave public reason little room to operate. In a sense, public reason is most important when there is
disagreement. When everyone accepts the premises and inferences
that justify a policy, then public justification is least urgent. It is
when there is disagreement about government action that reasons
need to be given, but the stringent principle, excluding all contested
beliefs from any role in public reason, seems to rule out public reason-giving in precisely this situation.
Consider a second relaxation of the principle: A more plausible
exclusionary principle might exclude all reliance on a subset of contested beliefs that concern morality. This principle would allow the
inclusion of contested factual beliefs and contested rules of inference,
but would exclude any moral belief from public reason if the belief
was contested by any adult citizens in full possession of their faculties, acting on the basis of a sincere desire to reach the truth. Thus,
public reason would include any moral belief that was accepted by
all competent citizens; for example, the idea that the killing of an
innocent is a prima facie wrong might count as such a moral belief.
This exclusionary principle would allow for more robust public

discourse than the more stringent principle, but it, too, would impose
a severe limitation. It might well be the case that public reasons
could be developed for many policies from uncontested moral premises, but discussion would stop whenever contested moral beliefs became part of the argument. The exclusion of all contested moral
beliefs would mean that even an argument that begins with uncontested moral beliefs is disqualified if it builds to conclusions which
themselves are moral beliefs derived from the uncontested premises,
but nonetheless are not accepted by all competent citizens.
Moreover, the kind of moral belief that gains universal acceptance
is likely to be quite weak. For example, even the Pareto principle,
that a state is preferred if it makes at least one person better off and
none worse off, would not meet this requirement. There are many
competent citizens who believe that being made better off is not a
good if it results in any inequality.
Consider a third relaxation of the principle - this time by excluding contested moral beliefs only if they are not used to directly support the conclusions of political arguments. This principle would
allow the disclosure of foundational beliefs that are contested, but
would disallow their use as direct support for conclusions of public
reason. For example, one might argue from a theological premise to
a respect for human life to the conclusion that the government
should provide adequate food and housing for all citizens. The contested theological premise serves a foundational role, but direct support for the proposition of public policy is provided by an
uncontested belief - that human life should be respected. Even
when limited in this way, the principle of excluding contested beliefs
does not seem plausible. It limits the efficacy of public discussion to
cases in which disagreement can be resolved on the basis of arguments that include only uncontested beliefs in roles of direct support.
Given the wide diversity of moral opinion, public debate that was
conducted in conformity with this ideal would likely be shallow and
truncated.
b.

Exclusion of Religious Beliefs

Another exclusionary principle might prohibit only the use of religious beliefs, allowing other moral beliefs in public debate. This
principle is related to that of excluding contested beliefs, because in
modern democratic societies, all religious beliefs are contested. 33 For
example, in the United States, Islam, Hinduism, Shinto, and a variety of other religions coexist with Protestantism, Catholicism, and
33. It might be argued that religious beliefs are more contested than other moral
beliefs, but this seems doubtful. Disagreement about a variety of secular doctrines seems
just as intense and persistent as disagreement about religious doctrine.
744
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Judaism. Moreover, the beliefs of all religions are disputed by secular viewpoints.
Contrasted with the principle of excluding all contested beliefs,
the principle of excluding religious beliefs seems at least feasible.
Assuming that the principle is relaxed to allow the use of nonreligious reasons (e.g. killing is morally wrong) that are affirmed on the
basis of religious foundations (e.g. because God has commanded it),
this principle would allow for reasonably robust public discussion.
Assuming there were good reasons to adopt it, the principle could be
implemented.
There are, however, severe problems with this principle. First, the
exclusion of religious beliefs from public discourse is unfair to those
who are believers. Construed so as to be least fair to believers, this
principle would exclude only theist beliefs, but allow atheist beliefs
as public reasons. On the one hand, believers could not argue for
public aid to religious school on the ground that religious training
would be good for children. On the other hand, nonbelievers would
be free to argue against such aid on the ground that religious schools
promote false and dogmatic belief systems. This would appear to be
an unfair double standard for believers.
Of course, this blatant unfairness might be corrected by reformulating the standard to exclude all beliefs about religion, including,
for example, atheist beliefs. Taken literally, this formulation would
be self-defeating because this proposed ideal of public reason is a
political belief about religion, and hence would itself be excluded
from public discourse. Let us assume that the ideal could be modified to allow a limited class of public debate about the role of religion in political life, without appeals to the truth or falsity of
particular religious doctrines. The question of fairness still remains.
Those with religious beliefs will argue that it is unfair to allow
nonbelievers to appeal to secular moral and philosophical doctrines
while requiring believers to refrain from voicing the full range of
their moral and religious beliefs. Why should it be permissible for
utilitarians to appeal to the truth of utilitarian moral theory if it is
impermissible for Catholics to appeal to the truth of Catholic doctrine? A full answer to this question is beyond the scope of this Article, although other articles in this Symposium do address that topic.
The point that bears emphasis is that both secular and religious
views contain deep and controversial doctrines that are not public in
the sense that they can reasonably be affirmed by the public at large.
Atheists cannot reasonably be asked to affirm the proposition that

belief in God is an essential component of the good life; believers
cannot reasonably be asked to affirm the proposition that pleasure
and pain are the ultimate sources of value. Given that both religious
and secular doctrines contain such deep and controversial beliefs, a
liberal ideal of public reason ought not to exclude religious beliefs
and allow secular beliefs. Some other criteria must be formulated to
give content to an ideal of public reason.
c. Exclusion of Nonpublic Reasons
The final proposal is to formulate an ideal of public reason that
excludes from public debate all reasons that are nonpublic. Without
definition, this principle would be empty. By "nonpublic," I mean
those reasons that are not public reasons as defined by Rawls. If
public reasons are (1) common-sense beliefs, (2) ideas from our public political culture, and (3) the noncontroversial conclusions of science, then nonpublic reasons are the rest. This includes deep beliefs
about the nature of the good that form part of various comprehensive religious and moral doctrines.
Another category of nonpublic reason is not captured by the discussion so far. Statements that deny the freedom and equality of
fellow citizens may be considered nonpublic reasons. Of course, this
simple formulation would need to be spelled out in some detail. For
now, the principle might be explicated in terms of its application to
racist speech. For example, a racist might argue against antidiscrimination laws on the ground that a particular group was not fully
human and hence was not deserving of the equal respect accorded
citizens of other racial groups. This argument would be excluded on
the basis of a principle excluding statements that deny the free and
equal status of citizens. The principle itself might be justified on the
ground that such racist remarks cannot be accepted as reasonable by
those of one's fellow citizens who belong to the denigrated group.
Hence, racist statements which deny the free and equal status of
citizens are not addressed to the public at large; they are not public
reasons.
With this important addition in place, let us stipulate that the
principle of excluding nonpublic reasons will not exclude reasons
that are public except in the sense that they may have a nonpublic
foundation. The nonpublic foundation for such public reasons would
itself be excluded from public discussion and from a direct role in
deliberation, but public reasons would be admitted to public political
debate irrespective of their foundations. The proposal is that an ideal
of public reason might be given content by a principle excluding any
direct role for nonpublic reason in public debate or discussion.
Should we accept this proposal?

Constructing Public Reason

[VOL 30: 729. 1993]

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

First, it must be conceded that the principle of excluding nonpublic reasons would be chosen over the principle of laissez faire. Given
the fact of pluralism, that principle does not insure that the reasons
offered in public political debate can reasonably be accepted by the
public at large.
Second, the principle of excluding nonpublic reasons would be
chosen over the principle of excluding all contested reasons (or all
contested moral reasons). If all contested reasons were excluded,
public political debate would be severely restricted. Allowing all
public reasons (as defined here) would facilitate a more robust and
effective role for public political debate.
Third, the principle of excluding nonpublic reasons would be chosen over the principle of excluding religious reasons. Whereas that
principle could not be accepted as fair by believers, the principle of
excluding nonpublic reasons could be. Exclusion of all nonpublic.reasons puts the deep beliefs of both theists and atheists on equal
footing.
Based on these three comparisons, we have a prima facie reason to
accept the principle of exclusion of nonpublic reasons as the best interpretation of the ideal of public reason. An important comparison,
however, has yet to be made. The next section introduces the possibility of an inclusionary ideal of public reason.
3. Principles of Inclusion
An ideal of public reason might be specified in yet another way by principles of inclusion.3 4 A principle of inclusion offers criteria for
what must be included in an argument in order for it to comply with
an ideal of public reason. It is possible to comply with a principle of
inclusion, even if nonpublic reasons are part of an argument. For
example, policy A might be justified by public reason P and nonpublic reason Q. So long as P provided a sufficient justification for A,
the inclusion of Q would not violate an inclusionary principle satisfied by P.3 5
There are several possible principles of inclusion. The most stringent principle of inclusion corresponds to the most stringent principle
34. The discussion that follows includes previously unpublished material cited in
RAWLS, supra note 7, at 247 n.36.

35. Principles of inclusion raise questions about sincerity. Under what conditions
would public reason be viewed as merely pretextual, with the nonpublic reason constituting the real reason for public action? This question is discussed in Solum, supra note 1.

of exclusion: An ideal of public reason might require that every public policy be supported by a sufficient reason that relies on uncontested beliefs. This possibility does not require extensive
consideration. The weaknesses of the principle of excluding contested
belief would apply to a principle that required a sufficient reason for
including only uncontested beliefs. Such reasons would run out too
soon.

Analogously, a principle that required the inclusion of sufficient
secular reasons would suffer from the same defect as a principle excluding religious reasons. Believers could not accept such a principle
as reasonable, and because our society includes large numbers of believers, an effective ideal of public reason must be reasonably justifiable to them.
The most promising inclusionary principle, therefore, is one that
requires the inclusion of public reasons. This principle would allow
for robust debate but would not be unfair to those with religious
views. Unlike the principle of excluding nonpublic reasons, the principle of including public reasons would allow citizens to advance
nonpublic reasons in public debate. Of course, nonpublic reasons
would only be allowed if sufficient public reasons were also given.
This implies that nonpublic reasons could only be given in two circumstances: (1) if the nonpublic reason were the foundation for a
public reason, and (2) if the nonpublic reason were an additional
sufficient justification for a policy that would be given an independent and sufficient justification by a public reason. Both the exclusive
and inclusive versions will result in the giving of sufficient public reasons, but the inclusive version will allow a specified role for nonpublic reasons as well.
Would the principle of including public reasons be chosen over the
principle of excluding nonpublic reasons? Like the principle of excluding nonpublic reasons, the principle of including public reasons
would foster civility and the civic virtue of tolerance. It would do this
in two ways. First, by requiring citizens to give a public reason, the
principle of inclusion assures that no citizen will call for the coercion
of another citizen without giving a reason the other views as reasonable. Second, by requiring citizens to exclude nonpublic reasons that
are not the grounds for public reason, the principle of inclusion assures that no citizen will call for the coercion of another on the basis
of grounds the other would view as wholly unreasonable. That is, no
one will be coerced on the basis of a reason that cannot be seen as an
alternative deep foundation for a reason that is public and thus can
be accepted as reasonable. The principle of including public reasons
is not inconsistent with the duty of civility - the duty of citizens to
explain how the coercive use of state power can be supported by public reason.
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Of course, it must be conceded that there is at least one prima
facie reason to believe that the principle of excluding nonpublic reasons might do a better job of respecting the values captured by the
duty of civility than would the principle of including nonpublic reasons. The principle of including public reasons allows some nonpublic
reasons to be given in public constitutional debate. Even if these nonpublic reasons are limited to a supporting role for public reasons,
allowing them at all risks undermining the value of civility. After all,
the fact that a religious reason is given at all may be offensive to
some.
There are, however, reasons to believe that the principle of including public reasons might do a better job of fostering civility and tolerance than would the exclusionary principle. First, it is possible that
the giving of nonpublic reasons (which are not shared) that are the
foundations of public reasons (which are shared) will foster a sense
of political solidarity and tolerance. If I see that you and I agree
about fundamental public values, despite our disagreement about the
moral foundations of those values, I may come to see your fundamental views as reasonable - despite my unwillingness to accept
them as true.3 6
The second reason to prefer the principle of including public reasons is that the principle of exclusion has as its corollary a duty of
limited intolerance. Adherence to the principle of exclusion implies
two duties. The first is a duty of forbearance: I myself must forbear
from giving nonpublic reasons. This follows from the first role of an
ideal of public reason - as a standard for self-restraint. The second
is a duty of limited intolerance: I must disapprove when others fail to
forbear by violating the principle of exclusion. This follows from the
second role of an ideal of public reason - its role as a standard of
public criticism. Of course, my disapproval must itself be civil, expressed in terms that respect the freedom and equality of my fellow
citizens who violate the principle of exclusion. But I must disapprove
because, on the principle of excluding nonpublic reasons, my fellow
citizens have acted wrongly in giving nonpublic reasons. By contrast,
the principle of inclusion has as its corollary a duty of tolerance.
Correlative to the permission granted by the principle of including
public reasons, for* citizens to advance their own comprehensive
moral or religious doctrines as supporting grounds for public reasons
that bear on the constitutional essentials, is the duty to listen with
36.

This point was first suggested to me by Sharon Lloyd.

respect and tolerance for these views.
Compliance by citizens with the duty of limited intolerance imposed by the principle of excluding nonpublic reasons may well undermine their development of the civic virtue of tolerance. By
contrast, compliance with the duty of tolerance imposed by the principle of including public reasons would naturally seem to foster the
civic virtue of tolerance. Thus, comparing the two interpretations of
the ideal of public reason, the principle of including public reasons
would seem to do a better job of fostering the civic virtue of tolerance and thus indirectly supporting the value of civility. Because this
virtue is a very great political good, there is a strong reason (all else
being equal) to prefer the principle of including public reasons.
The third reason for preferring the principle of including public
reasons is that giving the nonpublic reason expresses the ideal of full
respect for the autonomy of fellow citizens. The third argument begins with the premise that there is an ideal of full respect for fellow
citizens as free and equal. Call this "the ideal of full respect." This
ideal expresses the notion that one ought to treat one's fellow citizens
as possessing an equal human reason that grounds their capacity to
exercise their freedom. Treating one's fellows as reasonable in this
sense requires that one give them reasons when acting in a way that
affects them; one such action might be voting on the coercive use of
state power. The full requirements of this ideal include: (1) that I
give fellow citizens reasons which they could accept as reasonable
(i.e., I give them public reasons), (2) that I do not give them reasons
that they could not accept as reasonable (i.e., I give them only public
reasons), and (3) that I disclose to them all of the reasons that are
the basis for my position (i.e., I make a full disclosure).
But given the fact of pluralism, we cannot attain completely the
ideal of full respect. The fact of pluralism creates tension between
refraining from the giving of nonpublic reasons and giving all the
reasons upon which I am actually relying. Given the fact of pluralism, citizens will frequently, even usually, have nonpublic reasons as
foundations for the public reasons that support their views with respect to constitutional essentials. The question then becomes, given
that the ideal of full respect can be only partially realized, which
aspect of the ideal should give way?
It seems that it is the ideal of refraining from the giving of nonpublic reasons that must give way. Why? The principle of excluding
nonpublic reasons assumes that one's fellow citizens should not even
be allowed to listen and think about the nonpublic reasons, because
they might not understand that these nonpublic reasons play only a
supporting role. By contrast, the principle of including public reasons
assumes that citizens have the ability to listen with tolerance and
even learn from others' religious and moral beliefs.
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The fourth reason to prefer the inclusion of public reason principle
over that of excluding nonpublic reasons is that we ought to favor
authenticity in political debate. Allowing the disclosure of nonpublic
reasons reinforces authenticity; suppressing nonpublic reasons that
really do play a foundational role detracts from authenticity. There
are two supporting grounds for this fourth reason. First, one cannot
regard something as a political virtue when it amounts to dissembling. But if nonpublic reasons really do play a foundational role,
then their suppression may amount to dissembling - at least in
those particular political debates where their foundational role becomes relevant to the debate. In those debates, the ordinary canons
of fair argument would require disclosure. Second, there are reasons
to believe that inauthenticity in political argument can be a very
great evil. Given our history, we have good reason to fear political
positions that are advanced on the basis of hidden agendas.
The fifth and final reason to prefer the principle of including public reasons over that of excluding nonpublic ones is that there may be
times when allowing nonpublic reasons is necessary to prevent a
great evil. The use of religious argument by the abolitionists may
have been a case of this sort. Assume that the abolitionists' case for
emancipation of the slaves rested in part on the argument that it was
an offense against God to treat as property a being that he created in
his image. Assume further that offering this nonpublic reason in political debate was an essential precondition for the events that led to
the freeing of the slaves. The nonpublic reason (the argument from
the assumption that God created all humans in his image) served as
the ground for a public reason (the fundamental equality of persons). The abolition of slavery was a very great good, and I think
many Americans share the intuitive sense that the use of religious
argument by the abolitionists was not an offense against political
morality. That the principle of including public reasons fits this intuitive sense counts in its favor. Moreover, there are other cases of this
sort. The contemporary civil rights movement also uses religious appeals, as powerfully illustrated by the speeches of Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr."'

37.
38.

For Rawls' discussion of this example, see RAWLS, supra note 7, at 249-51.
See id. at 250 n.39.

IV. A

RESTATEMENT OF THE LIBERAL IDEAL OF PUBLIC REASON

This final section summarizes the argument by restating the liberal ideal of public reason in light of the many distinctions, qualifications, and arguments that have been explored so far.
First, the principle of laissez faire for private discussion should
govern (1) private discussion, whether of political or private matters
and (2) public discussion of moral and cultural matters. Two considerations are central here. Initially, there is no need for a more restrictive principle governing private discussions or public discussions
that do not concern politics in a direct way. Civility and tolerance
can flourish without extending the political ideal of public reason to
discussions in families and communities of voluntary association such
as churches. Public debate over ethics and politics may undermine
civility and tolerance, but the risk is far less grave than in the case of
public political debate over the coercive use of state power. In addition, the freedom of thought and expression would be gravely infringed if nonpublic reasons were viewed by citizens as not
legitimately voiced and debated in the private sphere. Although the
threat would be less grave if public discussion of ethics and politics
were proscribed by an ideal of public reason, the loss would still be
great. The discussion of art, literature, morality, and the like would
be far less robust if citizens observed an ideal of restraint that removed deep and controversial questions about the good and the
meaning of life from such discussions.
Second, public debate by private citizens should be governed by
two principles. The first of these is the inclusion of public reasons in
public discussion and private deliberation concerning the coercive
use of state power. The case for the principle of including public
reasons already has been stated at length, but the core of the argument is simple. Public reasons should be included because only public reasons can be viewed as reasonable by the public at large. The
giving of reasons to one's fellow citizens is required by the notion
that one should respect them as free and equal. An ideal which requires that public reasons be given but allows nonpublic reasons to
be given as well will do the best job of fostering the virtues of civility
and tolerance, as compared to the principle of laissez-faire or a principle of exclusion.
The second principle governing public debate is the exclusion of
intolerance and disrespect for the freedom and equality of fellow citizens in public discussion. The ideal of public reason supports the
exclusion of racist, sexist, and homophobic speech from public debate over the use of coercive state power. Allowing the inclusion of
this sort of speech would not foster civility and tolerance; rather, it
would undermine those values.
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Finally, the behavior of public officials in their official capacity
should be governed by the principle of excluding nonpublic reasons.
Public officials are different from private citizens because they personify the state; the statements of public officials in their official capacity are, in a real sense, the statements of the state and hence of
the public at large. For this reason, it would be unfair to allow public officials to express their own deep convictions about the good as
the official reasons for state action. Allowing public officials to advance nonpublic reasons would violate the requirement of treating all
citizens fairly. Moreover, this requirement does not violate the freedom of conscience or expression of public officials. Public office is
entered voluntarily, and public officials retain their full freedoms
when they speak in their capacity as private citizens.
Together, these principles constitute a liberal ideal of public reason. Such an ideal is not aimed at limiting the common human capacity for reason. Public reason does limit the expression of some
reasons in some contexts, but not for arbitrary or unprincipled reasons. Public reason does not require that we refrain from reflection
about the matters of deepest significance; it does focus our reason on
the pluralism that characterizes modernity. In the sphere of public
political debate, an ideal of public reason must be justified in accordance with public reason. Because of this constraint, the justification
of public reason by political liberalism is shallow in the sense that it
can only draw on common sense and our public political culture. But
even those resources are sufficient for public reason to make the case
to each citizen that he or she should .find the roots of the political
ideal of public reason in his or her own deepest convictions. In this
way, public reason transcends itself.

APPENDIX: HISTORICAL FORMULATIONS OF PUBLIC REASON

This Appendix presents a brief survey of the historical uses of the
phrase "public reason"; this survey is not intended to provide an intellectual history. Rather, this recounting of the use of "public reason" in the writings of Hobbes, Rousseau, Jefferson, and Kant is
intended to illustrate the variety of uses to which the phrase can be
put. Some common themes emerge, but we should not assume that
all uses of the phrase refer to the same concept. We begin with the
earliest use of the phrase to be discussed, that by Thomas Hobbes. 3
A. Hobbes
The phrase "public reason" is found in Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan.40 The section of Leviathan in which this passage appears addresses the question, whose reason should govern the question of
whether a purported miracle has occurred?
For in these times, I do not know one man, that ever saw any such wondrous work, done by the charm, or at the word, or prayer of a man, that a
man endued but with a mediocrity of reason, would think supernaturall:
and the question is no more, whether what we see done, be a Miracle;
whether the Miracle we hear, or read of, were a reall work, and not the act
of a tongue, or pen; but in plain terms, whether the report be true, or a lye.
In which question we are not every one, to make our own private Reason, or
Conscience, but the Publique Reason, that is, the reason of God's Supreme
Lieutenant, Judge; and indeed we have made him Judge already, if wee
have given him a Soveraign power, to doe all that is necessary for our peace
and defence. A private man has alwaies the liberty, (because thought is
free,) to beleeve, or not beleeve in his heart, those acts that have been given
out for miracles, according as he shall see, what benefit can accrew by mens
belief, to those that pretend, or countenance them, and thereby conjecture
whether they be Miracles, or Lies. But when it comes to confession of that
faith, the Private4Reason
must submit to the Publique; that is to say, to
1
God's Lieutenant. '

In this passage, Hobbes uses the phrase "public reason" to refer to
the reason or judgment of the sovereign. Why should the reason of
the sovereign be dispositive of the question of whether a miracle has
taken place? An adequate answer to this question is beyond the
scope of this Article,42 but three points may help to illuminate his
meaning. First, Hobbes' discussion of miracles is part of his attempt
to solve the problem of instability generated by religious disagreement. Second, Hobbes believes that private judgment about matters
of religion contributes to instability for two reasons: (a) individuals
exercising their own judgment about their duty to God are likely to
39.

Hobbes' use is the earliest that I have been able to locate.

40.

THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (R. Tuck ed., 1991).

41. Id. at pt. 3, ch. 37, T 13/13, at 306 (emphasis added) (pp. 436-37 in the
Molesworth edition, pp. 477-78 in the Macpherson edition).
42. For an elegant and illuminating reading of Leviathan, see S. A. LLOYD. IDEALS
AS INTERESTS IN HOBBES'S LEVIATHAN: THE POWER OF MIND OVER MATTER (1992).
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come to widely divergent conclusions and (b) individuals may believe
they have a transcendent interest in fulfilling that duty, even though
it might cause social instability. Third, for a variety of reasons, Hobbes believes that each individual in a state with an effective sovereign has good reason to accept the sovereign's judgment about some
religious matters. In part, Hobbes' argument on this point relies on
the argument that Christians have good religious reasons to accept
their sovereign as God's lieutenant on Earth. For these religious matters, the sovereign's reason is thus the reason of the public at large,
because it is the reason that should govern the public's actions. We
might say the Hobbesian view of public reason is that the reason of
the sovereign is the reason of the public on matters in which there is
a good reason to obtain universal public agreement.
B.

Rousseau

A second use of the phrase "public reason" is found in Rousseau's
Discourse on PoliticalEconomy:
In effect, though nature's voice is the best advice a good father could listen
to in the fulfillment of his duty, for the magistrate it is merely a false guide
which works constantly to divert him from his duties and which sooner or
later leads to his downfall or to that of the state, unless he is restrained by
the most sublime virtue. The only precaution necessary to the father of a
family is that he protect himself from depravity and prevent his natural
inclinations from becoming corrupt, whereas it is these very inclinations
that corrupt the magistrate. To act properly, the former need only consult
his heart; the latter becomes a traitor as soon as he listens to his. Even his
own reason ought to be suspect to him, and the only rule he should follow is
the public reason, which is the law. Thus nature has made a multitude of
good fathers of families, but it is doubtful that, since the beginning of the
world,43human wisdom has ever produced ten men capable of governing their
peers.

Rousseau's use of the phrase "public reason" is quite different
than Hobbes'. Public reason is contrasted to the reason of private
43. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, Discourse on Political Economy
JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU: THE BASIC POLITICAL WRITINGS 116 (Donald

§ I, 1 1/6, in
A. Cress trans.,

1987). A similar use is found in the Discourse on Inequality:
What is one to think of an interaction where the reason of each private individual dictates to him maxims directly contrary to those that public reason
preaches to the body of society, and where each finds his profit in the misfortune of another? Perhaps there is not a wealthy man whose death is not
secretly hoped for by greedy heirs and often by his own children; not a ship at
sea whose wreck would not be good news to some merchant; not a firm that a
debtor of bad faith would not wish to see burn with all the papers it contains;
not a people that does not rejoice at the disasters of its neighbors.
JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU. DISCOURSE ON THE ORIGIN OF INEQUALITY n.9, 1 2/15, at 89
(Maurice Cranston trans., 1985).

individuals. The latter sort of reason is self-interested; the former
sort is concerned with the common good. This suggests a connection
between Rousseau's idea of public reason and his notion of the general will. The general will (like public reason) is concerned with the
good of all; whereas, the individual will (like private reason) is concerned with the good of the individual."
C. Jefferson
Another early use of the phrase "public reason" is found in
Thomas Jefferson's Second Inaugural Address:
[I]t is proper that you should understand what I deem the essential principles of our government, and consequently those which ought to shape its
administration ....
[They include] the diffusion of information and the
arraignment of all abuses at the bar of public reasons.45

Jefferson's notion of public reason seems connected to an ideal of
democratic government. Information should be widely diffused so
that government actions may be judged at the bar of public reason
which in this case seems to be the collective reason of the citizens
of a democratic society. In this view, the quality or efficacy of public
reason is connected to the freedom of speech and press.
D. Kant
In What is Enlightenment,4 Kant introduces the idea of public
reason as an answer to a question that might be phrased, "What
restrictions on freedom of public discourse will facilitate public enlightenment?" Kant replies:
The public use of man's reason must always be free, and it alone can bring
about enlightenment among men; the private use of reason may quite often
be very narrowly restricted, however, without undue hinderance to the progress of enlightenment. But by the public use of one's own reason I mean
that use anyone may make of it as a man of learning addressing the entire
readingpublic. What I term the private use of reason is that which a person may make
of it in a particular civil post or office with which he is
47
entrusted.

As Kant uses the phrase, "public reason" is defined in terms of the
audience to which reasons are given. Public reason is addressed to
44. I find Joshua Cohen's discussion of Rousseau to be most helpful. See Joshua
Cohen, Reflecting on Rousseau: Autonomy and Democracy, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 275
(1986).
45. THOMAS JEFFERSON, First InauguralAddress, Mar. 4. 1801, in THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 494-95 (Merril D. Peterson ed., 1984) (also in THOMAS JEFFERSON,
THE PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON 293-94 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1977) and I CoMPiLATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS: 1789-1897, at 309, 311
(James D. Richardson compiler, 1969)).

46. IMMANUEL KANT. An Answer to the Question: 'What is Enlightenment,' in
LITICAL WRITINGS 55 (H. Reiss ed. & H. B. Nisbet trans., 1990).
47. Id. (emphasis added).
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the entire public."' Public reason should be free if the public is to
become enlightened - that is, if citizens are to rely on their own
reason without the guidance of another. 9 Notice Kant's use of the
phrase is, in a sense, diametrically opposed to Hobbes'. For Hobbes,
public reason is reason bound by the judgment of the sovereign; for
Kant, public reason is precisely that reason which is free from such
constraint.
In order to understand Kant's idea of public reason, we begin with
his investigation of its opposite - what he calls "private reason."
Kant's writing suggests two different formulations of private reason,
taken as that from which public reason differs. The first formulation
is suggested by the passage stating that private reason is the use of
reason "in a particular civil post or office."' 50 This passage suggests
that private reason is defined by the role of the speaker. Private reason is the reason of a public official - again a contrast with Hobbes.
The second formulation is suggested by the definition of public reason in terms of audience: private reason would be reason directed at
a private audience. This formulation is supported by one of Kant's
examples. Kant argues that a member of the clergy addressing his
congregation uses private reason because he does not address the
public at large. In the capacity of priest to a particular congregation,
his reason is not free, but is restricted by his commission.5 1 These
two formulations do not seem to be equivalent. An official, whose
reason is limited by authority, could address the public at large. A
citizen, whose reason is not so limited, could address a particular
audience.
Onora O'Neill suggests a reconciliation between the two formulations.52 She observes that the reason of an official is restricted by
authority and not solely by the force of the better reason itself.5
48. ONORA O'NEILL, CONSTRUCTIONS OF REASON: EXPLORATIONS OF KANT'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 32 (1989).
49. KANT, supra note 46, at 54.
50. Id. at 55 (emphasis added).
51. Id. at 56-57. Remember that the office of priest was a quasi-governmental office in the Prussia of Kant's day.

52.

O'NEILL,

supra note 48, at 28-50.

53. The idea of the force of the better reason is related to Habermas' notion of the
ideal speech situation, in which every participant is given an equal and unbounded opportunity to argue. See JORGEN HABERMAS, MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE
ACTION (C. Lenhardt & S. Nicholsen trans., 1990); JORGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE: AN INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF
BOURGEOIS SOCIETY (T. Burger trans., 1989); JORGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF

COMMUNICATIVE ACTION

(T. McCarthy trans., 1984 & 1987)

(two volumes); JORGEN

HABERMAS, COMMUNICATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY

(T. McCarthy trans.,

Even if addressed to the public at large, such reasons may fail to
communicate successfully because the audience may reject the authority that limits the reason. Thus, reason-giving by officials may
not be public, even though addressed to a public audience. 4 Analogously, reasons addressed immediately to a particular audience can
be said to be public if they are the sort of reasons that can be addressed to the public at large. Those reasons are not limited by authority, but are limited only' by the internal bounds of reason itself.5

The key to the Kantian idea of public reason is that the only limit on
free public reason is internal to reason itself.
Of course, these passages from Hobbes, Rousseau, Jefferson, and
Kant do not exhaust the meaning of the phrase "public reason." For

example, "public reason" is sometimes used to refer to reasons that
are of public as opposed to private interest. This use occurs in The
Federalist56 and in judicial opinions. 1 In this sense, a public reason
1979). For the connection between Habermas' views and the freedom of expression, see
Lawrence B. Solum, Freedom of Communicative Action: A Theory of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 54 (1988-89); see also Judith Lichtenberg,
Foundations and Limits of Freedom of the Press, 16 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 329, 351 n.40
(1987).
The parallel (but not equivalence) between Habermas' notion of discourse in the ideal
speech situation and Kant's conception of reason can be seen in the first critique. See
IMMANUEL KANT. CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON A738-39/B766-67 (Norman K. Smith
trans., 1929) ("Reason depends on this freedom for its very existence. For reason has no
dictatorial authority; its verdict is always simply the agreement of free citizens, of whom
each one must be permitted to express, without let or hinderance, his objections or even
his veto.").
54. O'NEILL, supra note 48, at 34. Kant himself recognizes this. KANT, supra note
46, at 56.
55. O'NEILL, supra note 48, at 35 ("The only authority internal to communication
is, on Kant's view, reason."); see also IMMANUEL KANT, What is Orientation,in Thinking, in POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 46, at 247 ("[F]reedom of thought also signifies

the subjection of reason to no laws other than those which it imposes on itself.").
56. Alexander Hamilton, writing in The Federalist:
The evident aim of the plan of the convention is that all the causes of the
specified classes shall, for weighty public reasons, receive their original or final
determination in the courts of the Union. To confine, therefore, the general
expressions giving appellate jurisdiction to the Supreme Court to appeals from
the subordinate federal courts, instead of allowing their extension to the State
courts would be to abridge the latitude of the terms, in subversion of the intent,
contrary to every sound rule of interpretation.
THE FEDERALIST No. 82, at 494 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
57. This usage was more common in the Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries. See, e.g., Virginia v. West Virginia, 238 U.S. 202, 205 (1915); Philadelphia Co. v.
Stimson, 223 U.S. 605, 637 (1912); Hannibal Bridge Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 194,
207 (1911); Vilas v. City of Manila, 220 U.S. 345, 356 (1911); Union Bridge Co. v.
United States, 204 U.S. 364, 400 (1907); United States v. Eaton, 169 U.S. 331, 338
(1898); Place v. Norwich & New York Transp. Co., 118 U.S. 468, 503 (1886); Cohens
v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 352 (1821) (quoting passage from The Federalist). A similar
use has been made by legal scholars. For example, Thayer, speaking of equal protection,
says, "A class cannot be selected because they have red hair, but . . . [only] on the
ground of some rational public reason." J. Thayer, Teaching Notes (Feb. 17, 1890),
Papers, Box 2, Folder 5 (on file in Harvard Law School Library) (cited in W. NELSON,
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is a reason that invokes a public as opposed to private good. However
many uses of "public reason" further investigation might reveal, this
survey is sufficient to establish that the phrase can be used to express
a variety of different (and indeed opposing) ideas.
E. The Rawlsian Idea of Public Reason in Historical Context
This Appendix concludes with a comparison of Rawls' formulation
of the ideal of public reason with the historical formulations that
have been briefly explored. Rawls' exposition is far richer and more
detailed than the summary in the body of this Article reveals, but
even this brief summation is sufficient to allow a comparison of his
use of the phrase "public reason" with those advanced by Hobbes,
Rousseau, Kant, and Jefferson. The primary focus will be on the relationship between Rawls and Kant, both because Rawls' formulation of the ideal is derived in part from that of Kant and because the
exploration of this relationship serves to illuminate the Rawlsian
view.
Again, begin with Hobbes. There is a sharp contrast between
Rawls' idea of public reason and that of Hobbes.5 8 For Hobbes, public reason is the reason of one person - the absolute monarch who is
the sovereign. For Rawls, public reason is the reason of the public at
large. Much closer to Rawls' idea of public reason is that of Rousseau. 59 Both Rawls and Rousseau see public reason as connected to
the distinct reason of the law. Rawls views the Supreme Court as the
exemplar of the public reason60 and Rousseau holds that magistrates
should use public reason, as opposed to the reason provided by their
own natural inclination. However, Rousseau's belief that there is a
clearly demarcated divide between public reason and private interest
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE

180 (1988)).
58. There are also similarities. In a special sense, Rawls agrees with Hobbes that
the reason of the sovereign is public reason. In a democratic society the public constituted as a corporate body of citizens is the sovereign, and public reason for Rawls is the
reason of the public body of citizens. It is also true that Hobbes' notion of public reason
responds to a sort of pluralism; Hobbes deployed the notion of public reason to address
disagreements generated by the differences in religious belief. So too, Rawls' idea of
public reason addresses the contemporary condition of pluralism: the reason of various
groups is not shared by the reason of the public at large.
59. That Rawls recognizes the affinity is indicated by his citation to The Social
Contract. See RAWLS, supra note 7, at 219-20 & n.6 ("[P]ublic reason with its duty of
civility gives a view about voting on fundamental questions in some ways reminiscent of
Rousseau's Social Contract.").
60. Id. § 6, at 231.

is not a feature of Rawls' idea.
Although we have only scant evidence from which to reconstruct
Jefferson's notion of the bar of public reason, there does seem to be
common ground between Rawls and Jefferson. Public reason as the
judge of official abuse, "the bar of public reason," expresses the idea
that public reason is the reason of the public. Jefferson's connection
of public reason to free expression further reinforces this interpretation. Unlike Rawls, Jefferson would not limit the sphere of public
reason to the constitutional essentials and the basic liberties. If official corruption must face the bar of public reason, then its jurisdiction must extend beyond the core of liberty and structure to a wider
sphere of public interest.
The final relationship, between the views of public reason held by
Rawls and Kant, is the most difficult to assess. On the one hand,
Rawls acknowledges that he takes the phrase "public reason" from
Kant."' Moreover, there are other important relationships between
Rawls' work on justice and Kant's moral theory.62 On the other
hand, there seem to be differences. Kant believed that the reason of
certain public officials was not public, because they were constrained
by their institutional roles as occupants of "a particular civil post or
office."163 Rawls believes that the reason of the Supreme Court is the
exemplar of public
reason, because the court is constrained by its
64
institutional role.
Yet beneath this surface of inconsistency may lie a deeper harmony. The core of Kant's conception of public reason is the idea that
public reason is free - limited only by those bounds that are internal to reason itself. One interpretation of Rawls (I think the wrong
one) is that Rawls' idea of public reason has limits that are external
to reason - that public reason cannot reach for the deepest truths
because of political concerns that are not grounded by reason itself.
Call this "the external-to-reason interpretation of the limits of public reason."
One might invoke Rawls' use of the fact of pluralism in support of
the external-to-reason interpretation. There is, he says, a "plurality
of conflicting, and indeed incommensurable, conceptions of the
meaning, value and purpose of human life." 65 We disagree about the
deepest and most important matters - about the nature of the good
and the meaning of life. Moreover, the fact of pluralism "is not a

61. See Rawls, supra note 7, at 213 n.2.
62. See TJ, supra note 5, § 40; Dewey Lectures, supra note 5.
63. KANT, supra note 46, at 55.
64. RAWLS, supra note 7, § 6, at 231.
65. John Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 1, 4 (1987).

[VOL. 30: 729. 1993]

Constructing Public Reason
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

mere historical condition that will soon pass away; it is ...a permanent feature of the public culture of modern democracies."66 This
fact is rooted in the history of Western Europe, in particular the
Wars of Religion of the sixteenth century and the subsequent religious conflicts in England and elsewhere. In a sense, the limits imposed by a liberal ideal of public reason are imposed because of
pluralism. Were it not for these deep and persistent disagreements, if
the fact of pluralism did not hold, then public reason could incorporate the publicly shared conception of the good.
Given the fact of pluralism, one might argue that the limits of
public reason are features of a modus vivendi. The argument continues: We deny ourselves the use of the deepest truths about the good
in public debate because we stand to gain more from the stability
that results than we lose by sacrificing our ability to argue from our
deepest convictions about the most important truths. If this line of
argument were correct, then the external-to-reason interpretation
would hold, and the Rawlsian conception of public reason would be
thoroughly inconsistent with the Kantian idea.
But this line of argument is not correct and that interpretation
does not hold. Rather, the best interpretation of Rawls' idea of public reason is that the limits that public reason imposes are internal to
reason. Call this interpretation "the internal-to-reasoninterpretation
of the limits of public reason." The case for this interpretation begins with the following passage: "Citizens affirm the ideal of public
reason, not as a result of political compromise, as in a modus
vivendi, but from withih their own reasonable doctrines. ' 7 What
does this mean? The limits of public reason are the subject of an
overlapping consensus68 between groups that affirm a variety of conceptions of the good. For example, the notion that one ought to respect the freedom and equality of one's fellow citizens might be
affirmed by believers on the ground that people are created as moral
equals and are endowed by their Creator with certain freedoms; the
same notion might be affirmed by nonbelievers for secular reasons.
Both believe it is true that one ought to respect the freedom and
equality of one's fellows, although they do so for different reasons.
Thus, the limits of public reasons, which are to be publicly justified by public reason itself, would be affirmed by the participants in
66.

Id.

RAWLS, supra note 7, at 218.
68. See Rawls, supra note 65; John Rawls, The Domain of the Politicaland Overlapping Consensus, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 233 (1989).

67.

an overlapping consensus on the ground that those limits are just,
given that modernity is characterized by the fact of pluralism. The
limits of public reason do not require that the deepest truths about
human nature or the good be set aside when we decide whether those
limits should be respected. From this perspective then, the limits of
public reason are internal to reason itself. We affirm the limits of
public reason because those limits are reasonable given the circumstances in which we find ourselves. This means that the limits of
public reason are historically contingent. But the historical contingency of a fact is not inconsistent with its truth. That the limits of
public reason are limits for our situation in our time does not mean
that they are external to reason - not unless one believes that the
truths discoverable by reason must be eternal truths. Beneath the
surface, Rawls and Kant agree in an important way about the nature
of public reason.69

69. 1 have not discussed an important question in the interpretation of Kant's position: What are the internal constraints of reason? It may turn out that Rawls and Kant
disagree on the question.

